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Abstract
Some basic sociophysical notions are described by a physicist, ten-
tatively for a sociologically-oriented reader.
1 Introduction
It is my great pleasure to respond the kind invitation of Dr. Johannes J.
Schneider to write a chapter in a book on sociophysics. Indeed, reading
papers where this term is used I have often an impression that it is elusive.
Now if I am, say an analytically oriented specialist in the humanities, I
should devote some pages to define the sociophysics. I prefer to leave the
term undefined; its picture depends on the point of view, from physics or
from sociology, then here again every definition is dangerous.
Actually, sociologists seem not to be terribly interested in the sociophysics
itself; still they notice the activity of the physicists on social networks. Some-
times this activity arouses harsh comments, with reinventing wheels as rather
mild. The graph on the mutual citations of the physicists and, say, sociolo-
gists working on the small world problem, shown in Ref. [1], shows that these
groups largely ignore each other. Calls to read papers written by sociologists
can be heard also from the physicists’ side [2]. In recent years a casual and
loose referring to trendy sources on ’social science’ (as [3] to [4]) was replaced
by more careful quotation of basic textbooks in mathematical sociology (as
[5] to [6]). We should note that one of the leading authors in sociophysics,
Serge Galam, published his early works in the Journal of Mathematical Soci-
ology and the European Journal of Social Psychology [7, 8, 9]. Also, he paid
much attention to references to sociological and psychological literature. To
give an example, in Ref. [8] there are only five references to physical papers,
including the original work of Ernst Ising from 1925; the other 29 references
are from social sciences, mostly the social psychology.
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If some agreement is possible between the sociologists and the physicists,
it is probably about the need of a more intense exchange of information.
What I try here is to explain how we physicists imagine and describe a
social system; to list standard tools of statistical physics used in sociophysical
papers. I will do it frankly; if a caricature appears at the output, let it be at
least clear. In this tentative description of sociology in physics (and not the
opposite) I am not going to provide a complete list of references. Rather,
my aim is to list most basic concepts as taken from the statistical mechanics
to describe social systems: variables, structure, interaction, temperature,
dynamics and phase transition. A subtitle of this text could be ’What you
have to know to reject the sociophysics’. Or to accept it - as you like.
2 Variables: spins, opinions, links and rela-
tions
In social sciences the term opinion is yet not precise enough. In sociophysics
we should then precise that we are interested in a social belief, not as com-
monly accepted as the property rights, but more widespread than a timetable
of cat feedings. The issue should be well known but debatable, as political
elections, the legality of abortion or the organization of health service. A
careful analysis of this term and the like can be found in [10].
In the sociophysics we represent opinions by spins. Spin is just a variable
assigned to an actor or agent. There is usually a large set of agents i, dis-
tributed in lattice sites or graph nodes; then, we have spin variable si. As a
rule in the sociophysical papers, spins can be of two values, +1 or -1, if not
stated otherwise. This is what is called: Ising spins [11]. With an increased
interest of physicists in problems from social sciences the term spin was re-
placed by opinion or the like, but the way how it is treated in mathematical
formulas and computer programs is more than often the same as in the the-
ory of magnetism [7, 8, 12, 13, 14]. A brief explanation of the Ising model
and of its maybe most common version - the so-called mean field theory can
be found in Ref. [15]. In general, models of the ferro-paramagnetic phase
transition contributed much to the sociophysical models. Basic review of the
statistical mechanics of the opinion dynamics can be found in Ref. [16]; the
authors write about the Ising paradigm.
The spin variable has been generalized to capture the situations when we
have more than two opinions. The spectrum of possibilities is either discrete
or continuous. In both cases we can also look for magnetic analogies; the
respective models are the Potts model [17] and the classical Heisenberg model
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[18] reduced to one variable. Multidimensional approach was used in [19, 20]
and presumably in other papers.
Usually we assign variables to cells of a lattice or nodes of a network. Al-
ternatively, we can assign variables to the network links. Often, we interpret
such variables as the relations between the nodes. They can be large or small
(strong or weak ties), positive or negative (friendly or hostile relations). In
most papers the relations are discrete (plus or minus one), but some authors
use also the continuous representation, as for example for the Heider balance
problem [21]. The latter case is termed weighted network or weighted graph
in the graph theory. In more general formulations separate sets of variables
are assigned to links and to nodes. This is in accordance with the sociolog-
ical textbooks on social networks, where the variables are termed structural
variables and composition variables [6].
3 Structure
In sociology, the social structure is an analytical tool [22]; this euphemism
indicates that the status of the term social structure is under debate. In a
geometrical sense, the structure is a set of units, with links between some
of them. References to some intermediate formulations can be found in Ref.
[22]; according to Peter Blau the structure is an ordered location of parts
of the system [23]. As noted above, in the social network theory separate
variables are assigned to the units and to the relations between them [6]. This
is almost equivalent to the mathematical definition of an unweighted graph.
How to assign this kind of structure to a set of social units (individuals or
groups) is the matter of research in sociology [6, 24] and in sociophysics [16].
Recent review on complex networks [25] written by physicists devotes five
pages to the social networks; the authors refer to sociological and physical
works, including the paper on the history of network analysis by Linton C.
Freeman [26]. The social networks is maybe the area of sociology where the
methodology is most established [6, 24, 27]; the refereed specialistic journal
Social Networks is about to enter fourth decade of its activity. There is
also an International Network for Social Network Analysis [28], and their 27-
th (8-th European) conference in 2007 provided an interdisciplinary venue
for social scientists, mathematicians, computer scientists, ethnologists, and
others to present current work in the area of social networks. A difference in
scale of effort devoted to social network analysis in sociology and sociophysics
is more than obvious.
The physicists and the like went en masse to the area of social networks
mostly after the paper of Watts and Strogatz in 1998 [29, 30]. Duncan J.
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Watts is professor of sociology at the Columbia University, but he got his
PhD title at theoretical and applied mechanics. In 2004 he published a paper
entitled A new science of networks [31], where he politely indicates the role of
the physicists in this part of sociology. However, as it is clearly demonstrated
in his text, it is the sociology where the basic research on the social networks
was started as early as around 1951 by Rapoport [32]. Paradoxically, four
oldest papers of Rapoport referred to by Watts were published in the Bulletin
of Mathematical Biophysics.
As it was noted by Watts, the (socio)physicists are fascinated mainly
in simple models and interdisciplinary applications. The scale-free graphs,
where the probability distribution of the degree, i.e. the number k of links
of a node is the power function k−γ, met in their minds with the univer-
sality principle, a hypothesis known for a long time in physics of magnetic
phase transitions. According to this principle the exponents (like γ above)
do depend only on the space dimensionality and the dimensionality of the
magnetization. Having an information on these dimensionalities, one should
be able to obtain the whole set of the exponents. Another universality in
networks, what a beautiful subject of research! In this way, the networks
– social or not – entered the computers of the physicists. Watts concludes,
that ’physicists may be marvelous technicians, but they are mediocre soci-
ologists’. For sure, in statistical physics we prefer to know something about
everything than the opposite.
Are the real social networks scale-free? In small societies, the statistics
is too poor to state it; in large societies it is not possible to investigate all
social bonds. A notable possibility is offered by databases on phone calls
and e-mail contacts [33], but in these cases the meaning of the term contact’
is somewhat twisted. There is also an obvious limitation of the number of
contacts a person can maintain; this is called the Dunbar number [34], and is
evaluated to be about 150. Therefore our question about the scale-free social
networks can deal only with not-too-large societies.
Michael Schnegg from Institute of Social Anthropology in Cologne investi-
gated six small societies, mostly African [35]. As the size of the societies was
between 41 and 142, the comparison of the measured degree distributions
P (k) with the power law function k−γ was rather provisional: some plots
were maybe similar, some other not at all. However, this evidence allowed
to find a correlation between the character of the plot and a purely sociolog-
ical quantity: the tendency to give to those from whom one received in the
past. Research on this tendency the so-called reciprocity has a long tradition
in social sciences [36, 37]. In this way, the description of the mathematical
structure of the investigated societies got a truly sociological dimension.
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4 Interaction
In physics, the only way for an object to exist is to have energy: a possibility
of doing work. In social sciences, there is nothing like energy: no energy
conservation, no energy measurement. In physics, the way how to detect the
interaction between objects is to observe correlations between their states.
In this sense, the physical interaction is detectable also in sociology.
According to Piotr Sztompka, in sociology there are four levels of the-
oretical description of interpersonal interactions [38]. At the first level the
interaction is described as a chain of impulses and reactions. This theory ben-
efits much on the behavioral psychology and experiments with rats [39]. At
the second level the theory of social exchange, usually associated to George
C. Homans [40], bases on the assumption of rational choice and uses the
formalism of the game theory [41, 42]. The above mentioned concept of reci-
procity applies right here. At the third level, meanings of interactions are
of concern as important determinants of human contacts. The partners cur-
rently analyse the content of the information which is mutually sent. If the
meanings of signals match, the contact can develop. The theory is termed
symbolic interactionism and it was created by Charles H. Cooley and George
H. Mead. At the last level of abstraction we find the theory of social roles
and labeling by Erving M. Goffman. The present author feels that it is ap-
propriate to abstain from describing this theory in one sentence, it is better
to refer to the literature [43].
In the sociophysics, most of these subtleties are lost. Within the mag-
netic analogy, the interaction between partners is reduced to the energy of a
mutual interaction. Once the states (opinions) of the partners 1 and 2 are
represented by their spins s1,2 = ±1, the interaction can be represented by
the Ising term −Js1s2. For J > 0 this interaction favors the same opinions
of the partners; for J < 0 - the opposite opinions. More examples of the
applications of the Ising model can be found in [11]. Results slightly more
general can be obtained with using a utility function [44] which plays the role
of negative energy; the action of the partners can be reduced to attempts to
get a maximum of this function.
If one intends to apply the game theory, the concept of the utility function
fails except for a narrow family of games, the so-called potential games [45].
An example of the potential games is the so-called network congestion game;
there, agents look for the shortest path to reach resources, distributed on a
network [46]. The interaction appears when two agents use the same path,
which is then more costful. For a review of games played on networks we
refer to Ref. [45]. Among other games, the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma is
discussed there. It is known to provide frames for numerous problems in
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ecology, international disarmament, marketing and other areas [42].
The number of methods how to model the mutual influence of partners
of a social interaction in computers is potentially unlimited. In the voter
model, an agent picks at random the opinion of a neighbor [47, 16]. In 1981
the psychologist Bibb Latane´ (now Director of his own Center for Human
Science) published an influential paper with mathematical formulation of the
theory of social impact [48]. Later his findings were developed, formalized and
simulated on computers [49, 50]. As variables, the authors use attitudes ±1,
and the changes of these attitudes depend on the persuasive and supportive
impact parameters of the partners. It is not far from these formulations to
more recent ones. In the Sznajd model [51], accordance of opinion of a pair
of neighbors causes that this opinion is shared also by other neighbors of the
pair. In the Deffuant model [52] opinions are represented by real numbers.
If opinions of two neighbors happen to be not too different, they approach
each other even closer. In the Hegselmann-Krause model the same yes-if-
not-too-far rule applies to all neighbors simultaneously [53]. In the Galam
model agents meet in small random groups and adopt the opinion of the
majority [54]. For a review we refer to [16], noting that the responsibility
of the sociophysicists for all that jazz is at least shared with professional
specialists in the humanities.
To summarize this section, in the sociological theory of networks the in-
teraction strength between two actors’ network nodes - is expressed by the
value of a variable assigned to the link or the tie - between these nodes [6].
According to the famous sociologist Mark Granovetter, this single variable
should express a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal ser-
vices which characterize the tie [55]. Granovetter demonstrated, that new
informations in a social network arrive usually by links which join otherwise
unconnected parts of the network. Such links are usually termed weak; the
role of weak ties became a cornerstone in the social network theory.
5 Temperature, information and noise
In physics, temperature is inseparably connected with energy. In thermal
equilibrium the probability of appearance of a given state depends on the
ratio E/T , where E is the energy of this state. As noted above, there is
no energy in social sciences; then it seems that the temperature cannot be
present there. However, there is also a more general view on the temperature,
which connects it with information or its lack [56]. This aspect can be useful
here.
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Suppose that the information is available about the actual state of a given
social issue. To give an example, everybody knows that the police efficiently
controls the city. This means that the uncertainty about the possible ac-
tion of the police is negligible. Bill wonders what if he robs the bank at
the city center. He finds that with probability close to one, practically for
sure, he will go to jail. The temperature assigned to this situation is zero;
T = 0. However, if nothing can be told about his future, then T is very
large; all states are equally probable. At intermediate situations, T is also
intermediate.
Having this aspect of temperature in mind, we can accept that some en-
ergies are assigned to tentatively social states. High energy of a state means
only that this state is considered as improbable. On the contrary, low en-
ergy means that the state will appear rather frequently. As a rule, the state
with the lowest energy (the so-called ground state) appears with the highest
probability. Then, temperature is an important measure of the probability
ratios. For T = 0, it is only the ground state which can be observed. For
T infinite, nothing is known. As it is known in social sciences, things per-
ceived as real are real in their consequences [57]. It is then of secondary
importance, if there is somebody in the society who knows more and who
can assign smaller temperature to the relevant probability distribution. Ac-
tors evaluate the probabilities according to their actual knowledge. In this
sense different temperatures can be assigned to different actors. Their states
of being informed or being uninformed is a social fact. Temperature can be
then used to describe a willingness to behave randomly, against rules. This
trick has been used to improve the original Schelling model of the urban
segregation [58, 59].
At equilibrium, temperature in the system is equal to the environment
temperature, this is an ultimate fate of every finite physical system. (A
question remains, how long it takes to make it equal?) This leveling can be
also treated as a rule when we deal with information, if we believe that every
secret will be known after long time. Before it happens, various temperatures
can be assigned to various actors. This option was used in Ref. [60], where
inhomogeneities of T were shown to lead to some kind of self-organisation.
The self-organized criticality [61] is of interest for itself in statistical
physics. In this state, the probability distribution of random fluctuations
is a scale-free function of the fluctuation size. This means, that the fluctua-
tion size is not limited from above. In particular, changes of a social system
in this state can be arbitrarily large; indeed there is an experimental evidence
that in some conditions a society is at the border of a limitless catastrophe
[62]. Recently, the dynamical behavior of a standard Ising system in these
conditions was simulated [63]; there, the temperature was a measure of in-
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tensity of the self-organized noise. In general, by temperature one can mean
an amount of uncertainty. This is an analogue to some physical probability
distribution functions, where in some cases the width of a maximum of the
function increases with temperature.
6 Phase transition, an equilibrium state and
the thermodynamic limit
What a sociophysicist likes most to obtain is a phase transition. The reason
is that he knows that social theories are qualitative. According to a common
knowledge, the phase is ’any of the forms or states (...) in which matter can
exist’ [64]. A change of phase, as for example a revolution or a paradigm
shift, should be perceptible in a society even without measurements. That is
why phase transitions are discussed so often in sociophysical papers [65, 66].
However, theories of phase transitions demand some ingredients which are
impossible to occur in the social world. First is the so-called thermodynamic
limit; the transition is well defined only in infinite systems. In an infinite
system there is always a finite probability that the phase will be changed
due to fluctuations of some uncontrollable quantities. This is particularly
true in social reality, where each system has its finite lifetime; from months
for a couple of lovers to centuries for an empire. Recently, a sociophysical
model was designed of a network of cooperating scientists or laboratories [67].
There, several phases of the network were distinguished, and the system was
able to change its phase in some kind of a random walk in the phase space.
In my opinion, this approach reflects the unpredictability of social systems.
It is also possible that some kind of change of state appears in a finite
system, but the transition point (as the critical level of noise) vanishes or
tends to infinity when the system size increases [68, 69]. These cases cannot
be termed phase transitions within the standard theory. However, the effects
can be meaningful in social sciences.
Second theoretical ingredient, connected with the previous one, is the
condition of equilibrium. In physics, the notion of equilibrium, although only
intuitive, is well established. In a social system, equilibrium is never attained.
Some correspondence to this difficulty exists also in the statistical physics,
for example in the theory of spin glasses. There, various processes proceed
with different velocities, from very quick to so slow that the laboratory went
bankrupt before the equilibrium is attained. In such cases one usually intends
to assume that there are two kinds of processes: very quick and those are
over before an experiment has started, and very slow and those do not change
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the system state while data are gathered. It is not always the case that this
assumption works, but maybe it is unavoidable in social experiments.
7 Dynamics
Statistical mechanics of the non-equilibrium processes is much less developed
than the equilibrium theory and this is not strange, because in the former
case the aim is much more ambitious. It is far from clear to what extent
deterministic dynamic processes can be described with any kind of averaging
over the state space. Basically, we rely on the theory of random walk, pow-
erful and rich in applications [70, 71]. Two particular methods of this theory
are applied in sociophysics relatively often: the master equations [72, 73] and
the Monte-Carlo simulation [74]. First method is analytical, relatively easy
and approximate, second is numerical, technically difficult and in principle
exact.
Numerous social processes were attempted to be described with these
methods: migration dynamics [72], residential segregation [2], competitions
[75], gossip [76], evolution of cultures [77] and languages [78], opinion dy-
namics [79, 80], innovations [82] and many others. All that is not far from
the research done by non-physicists: [83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 48, 89]. The flow
of ideas is multidirectional: references to complexity, diffusion, entropy, self-
organization, fluctuations, fractals, randomness, criticality and chaos can be
found in papers on economy and social sciences as well as in lists of physical
key-words.
In sociological textbooks [38, 90, 91] motifs of change, evolution, dynamics
and progress are basic. Social theories of change grapple with the separation
of what is constant from what is changing, what is cyclic from what is unique
[92]. One can imagine that we could be faced with similar problems in physics
if we decide to investigate a medium of some tens of objects, interacting but
well identified, distinguishable and with some memory. It is not clear if the
dogma of free will could make these problems seriously worse. Personally, I
would rather suspect that this dogma could be easily removed by some smart
approximation.
8 Final remarks
In sociophysics, physical notions and models are applied to social phenom-
ena. This means also that the sociophysicists treat the society as a physical
system. We look for a diffusion of opinions, for a hysteresis of strikes and for
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phase transitions in cultures as if they appeared in magnets. Even human
bodies can be treated as a physical material, with appropriate friction coef-
ficients, to describe the behaviour of crowds in cramped space [93]. It is not
surprising that in this research, experiments work better if light is switched
off. In general, a model system is less complex if agents are less endowed:
less strategies, shorter memory, information limited to nearest neighbors, etc.
In physics, we are trained to make our models as simple as possible. Then,
often we are tempted to approximate human minds by Something Somewhat
Simpler.
As noted in the Introduction, the sociophysicists are rightly criticized
by the social scientists for not referring to the sociological papers. There is
also another tension between the empirical and the hermeneutic sociology.
In the latter, the sociophysics will be at best ignored. Piotr Sztompka -
leading Polish sociologist - puts the behaviorism, Homans, Blau and Coleman
all together to a bag of epigones of positivism ([38], p.27). In a recently
edited set of basic texts [94], he quotes the essay of Stanisaw Ossowski from
1962 about differences between natural and social sciences. The Ossowski’s
arguments are [95]: self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy, influence of the
measurement on the measured properties of the system (vide: the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle), the conflict between specific character of investigated
societies and the need of universal results, the general lack of insight of
standardized statistical methods, the projection of the internal world of the
researcher on his results. To quote these arguments now means to treat them
either as currently valid or as a reference point for further discussion.
Let us explore the latter possibility. We are going to contrast at least
some of the above arguments with recent text of Adam Grobler [96] on the
methodology of sciences. According to his formulation, the opposition is to
be built between naturalistic and anti-naturalistic point of view. To start
from the former, the essential aim of science is to discover laws which are
experimentally verifiable and enable us to explain and predict the observed
phenomena. Further, there are three basic arguments against the naturalis-
tic approach. These are: 1) social processes are too complex and mutually
entangled, that the above given aim cannot be carried out; 2) social phe-
nomena do depend on human will and as such, they are unpredictable; 3)
in contrast to nature, people can take into account the social theory, what
influences the reality described by this theory.
As we see, point 3 matches with the first objection of Ossowski. As
it follows from further parts of the Grobler’s text, it can be dismissed by
construction of a series of theories, Tn. Each theory Ti+1 takes into account
the influence of previous Ti on the human behaviour. In the limit we get
the true theory. Let us add that temporal theories can also be useful as
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approximations, at least when describing behaviour of people less up-do-date
with the current state of sociological art. Similar argument is working for the
second objection of Ossowski, usually termed the interviewer effect. In this
case, the problem is even easier, as the measurement (polls) never touch the
whole population. If the poll result is published, again a next-step-theory
can take its influence into account.
The necessarily specific character of laws drawn from the observation of
a specific society reminds the pre-scientific, i.e. technological state of physics
[97]; in this sense the sociology can be seen as young in methods (but not in
problems discussed). However, we know that the related problem of sample-
dependence of the measured properties is eternal in the solid state physics.
In the statistical physics, the related phenomenon is investigated under the
name lack of self-averaging, and its appearance can serve as a fingerprint of
the critical states. Here, the point of view of a physicist can provide a new
insight. The next problem is how to interpret the results obtained with the
standardized statistical methods rather than whether to apply them; here
the sociophysics is in good company. Our way is to improve the methods to
be applied and not to resign beforehand.
The last problem raised in the Ossowski’s text does not apply only to so-
ciophysics or to naturalistically oriented sociology, but it threatens the whole
science [96, 97]. As such, it cannot be applied to deny the validity of natural-
istic sociology, if it does not invalidate the naturalism as a whole. Therefore,
the discussion of this point must be moved to another place. Coming back
to points 1) and 2) in the Grobler’s text, the author rightly indicates that
the objection on the complexity of social systems applies also to meteorol-
ogy; still nobody denies the need of weather forecasting, even if the results
are doubtful. Similarly, the free will of human beings does not preclude the
predictability of the human behaviour.
This point 1) in connection with 2) deserves a broader comment. It
seems that the arguments against application of natural sciences to social
systems base on the view of natural sciences in positivist frames. Indeed,
as it became known around 80s [98, 99], the deterministic character of laws
of physics which rule a dynamical system does not suffice to predict the
system behaviour. The effect is known as deterministic chaos. This allows
to continue the argument of Grobler, related to his point 2). Grobler says:
laws of nature do not lead to determinism. We can add: determinism does
not lead to predictability. Let us note here that in his textbook on sociology
[38] Piotr Sztompka makes a remark on the so-called butterfly effect. This
anecdotical effect (a move of butterfly’s wings can affect the weather) is an
example of the sensibility of a physical system behaviour with respect to its
initial conditions; a fingerprint of the deterministic chaos.
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From my point of view, the main postulate of the hermeneutic sociology is
to admit that people have minds and use them. Certainly we sociophysicists
should be then more careful when justifying our simple models, where some-
times this action of minds seems to be averaged out and finally removed by
virtue of the law of large numbers. Personally however I believe that there is
no contradiction between the hermeneutic sociology and the statistics. The
gap between the naturalistic or empirical sociology and the sociophysics is
perhaps smaller than the one between the naturalistic and the hermeneutic
or humanistic social science. A tolerant sociologist can treat the sociophysics
as a part of the mathematical sociology. We sociophysicists should also feel
to be a part of the whole, distinguished by some bias towards using ideas and
formalisms from the statistical mechanics. Can this bias be fruitful? While
the positive answer could be debatable, the negative answer is premature.
Concluding, it seems possible and desired that the boundaries between
sciences will be considered more as determined by methods, and not by sub-
jects of research. As good methods flow to other areas, we could evolve
to Unified Knowledge. This would be more modest than to declare a new
kind of science (reference removed). In my opinion the validity of all these
divisions is ultimately minor, when they are contrasted with our common
curiosity and interest in social laws. It is impossible to predict the future
state of our knowledge [100]; the same does apply to the ways to advances
in science.
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